Policing Directions in New Zealand for the 21st Century

Contents

• Executive summary

• Chapter 1: The case for change
• Chapter 2: Key principles to guide policing
• Chapter 3: Effective policing for New Zealanders
• Chapter 4: People in policing
• Chapter 5: Platforms for success
• Chapter 6: Anticipating the future
• Chapter 7: Next steps

• References
• Appendices

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Chapter 3:   Effective policing for New Zealanders

INTRODUCTION

3.1 Effective policing, which provides safety and security for citizens and their families, is at the heart of confident communities. Conversely, few things erode public confidence more than a sense that breaches of the law cannot be stopped; that vehicle collisions cannot be prevented; that serious crimes can remain unsolved; or that offenders can evade being brought to justice.

REINFORCING CLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL

3.3 As noted in Chapter 2, one of the strengths of the New Zealand system of policing is the independence safeguarded by the office of constable. Clarity around Police’s command structure also builds confidence in police carrying out their duties free from improper influence. Certainty about who is making operational policing decisions can be a useful start, and laws can play an important part in providing such certainty.

3.4 Currently, command and control arrangements for Police are set out in regulations. But they sit in an unclear relationship with the independence of the office of constable. This lack of clarity is unhelpful, as it raises doubts about the basic need within any disciplined organisation for senior officers to be able to direct staff to go to certain places and carry out certain duties. A related issue is the current lack of certainty regarding command and control decisions involving non-sworn Police staff, including whether they can legitimately direct the actions of their sworn colleagues. Increasingly this has become a practical issue, as non-sworn staff working in Police Communications Centres often need to give directions to police officers in patrol cars.

3.5 Command and control features currently in regulations could be elevated to statute. Added clarity might come from a new provision that identifies all members of Police working within the chain of command, including any overseas officers who join New Zealand Police temporarily as part of an exchange programme. It would also be possible to describe how the chain of command works sympathetically with, but does not subvert, the independence of the office of constable, or interagency protocols such as the Co-ordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). The end result would be a clear statement that all members of Police must obey the lawful commands of their superiors,[18] carry out their policing duties impartially, and not act under ministerial control, direction or instruction.

3.6 The Commissioner’s ability to give directives or guidance to staff could also be clarified. This is an area where there are problems at present, with a multi-tiered system of instructions that is unnecessarily complicated and confusing.[19] The Policing Act could include provisions to provide a more certain basis for authoritative communications from the top down within Police. The Commissioner’s ability to issue such directives or guidance using modern communication technologies, including via electronic media and on-line publication, might also be given legislative support.

IMPROVING THE ALLOCATION OF POLICE POWERS

3.7 New Zealanders’ expectations of how policing services are delivered are moving with the times. For example, public research in 2006 found a willingness to enable a greater range of Police staff to make use of appropriate powers to help tackle crime and disorder, and work at enhancing community safety.[20] Given these evolving expectations, the government wants to support a modern Police workforce structure which lines up more sensibly with targeted policing powers.

3.8 As highlighted in Chapter 1, New Zealand Police in 1958 was primarily composed of general duty constables, trained to undertake the safety preserving, order maintenance and evidence gathering policing tasks of the day. The advent of more technically complex investigative approaches, and increasing demands by the Courts, has resulted in a growing degree of specialisation and uptake of technical systems amongst Police employees. This has profoundly affected Police’s reliance on a workforce of generalists, who in the 1950s typically dealt only with paper-based files and physical evidence. Today, Police files can often be prepared entirely on computer, with electronic evidence needing to be produced in Court by highly-qualified experts.

3.9 One of the aims of the Police Act Review has been to explore whether current legislation clearly enables Police to employ the sort of workforce required for contemporary policing. Overall, the answer to this question is ‘no’. To achieve the required flexibility, for many years Police managers have had to work within the constraints of the existing legislation. This has involved artificial practices, such as appointing people as “temporary” or “casual” constables, then seeking to limit their powers through their employment agreements. This approach is unsatisfactory.

3.10 Taking on board the views of Police leaders and groups representing Police staff, change is required to better enable a modern Police workforce. As a starting point, the traditional role of constable should remain at the centre of policing. For those members of Police who require the full range of policing powers and protections, the office of constable is the time-honoured means through which they are extended. It is proposed the office of constable continue to serve as the access path for such general powers and protections.

3.11 The challenge is for new legislation to support a balance between generalist staff with broad ‘police craft’ skills and specialists in a range of specific policing roles. To meet this challenge, the intention is to build on the Commissioner’s existing ability to authorise staff to exercise duties, powers and functions under warrant.[21] This system could be extended to include the power to conduct personal searches.[22] It would enable the Commissioner to employ members of Police with the powers appropriate for their roles. For example, those who work as jailers and prisoner escorts require targeted powers (e.g., to search for concealed weapons) to safely carry out their jobs, and prevent harm to both themselves and detainees. Similarly, Police staff working in protective roles (such as those guarding government buildings and official residences) would seem to need powers to stop, detain and search people who might feasibly pose a threat to the places under guard or people in them.

3.12 There could also be potential benefits in allowing the Commissioner to extend a wider range of powers to Police staff involved in specialist areas of investigation.

3.13 For instance, money laundering, credit card fraud, identity theft, and other forms of e-crime are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Too few Police staff currently have the necessary skills to deal with the most complex technology-based crime. While the Commissioner already employs some staff with these skills as non-sworn members of Police, it is unclear if they are able to personally exercise the police powers necessary to fully pursue an investigation. This can give rise to bizarre outcomes. An example is where technical evidence needs to be recovered, but the specialist non-sworn employee who provides the information justifying a search warrant is unable to make an arrest or search a person of interest during the execution of that warrant - having to rely instead on assistance from a constable or detective who may know little about the case (and who almost certainly cannot extract or analyse the technical evidence). This situation is both inefficient and frustrating.

3.14 As the challenges of e-crime and other offending grow more complex, it becomes critical the Commissioner can attract and retain specialists to work as full members of Police investigative teams. Support might be given to the Commissioner’s call for such employees to supervise and direct relevant parts of Police investigations. To be fully effective, these staff need access to appropriate powers. It is hoped forthcoming Law Commission recommendations can assist in this regard.[23] More broadly, however, a new Policing Act could be used to provide a more rational way of allocating appropriate powers to members of Police.

3.15 To aid transparency, the government is open to the idea that broad categories of Police employees who might receive warranted powers be set out in legislation. For instance, based on the continuing success of the Crime Scene Attendant (CSA) trial in Auckland, it may make sense in future to give CSAs a limited cache of investigative powers. Other roles which may benefit from the ability to exercise intrusive police powers - for example, the power of search - could also potentially be established in legislation, with clear provisions for functions, powers and protections.

3.16 To reinforce public expectations any assignment of targeted police powers will be reasonable in the circumstances, there could be an accompanying requirement for the Commissioner to ensure any staff given warranted powers are suitably qualified and have the appropriate training to discharge their responsibilities. While the Commissioner’s competence to make judgments about suitable qualifications and appropriate training would be supported, such a requirement could provide extra assurance standards of professionalism will be maintained by all those Police staff entrusted with coercive powers.

IMPROVED INFORMATION SHARING TO TACKLE PERSISTENT OFFENDERS

3.17 There is an understandable public desire to see effective action against persistent offenders who commit a disproportionate amount of serious crime, and frustration when details emerge of people repeatedly on the receiving end of crime. Stopping repeat offenders in their tracks and reducing the cycle of repeat victimisation must be central planks of any modern policing strategy.

3.18 The drive against persistent offenders could benefit from clear legislative backing. It is vital the various agencies work together to eliminate unnecessary delays in passing on crucial information, to deal more effectively with recidivist offenders, and to provide a better service to victims and witnesses.

3.19 The Police Act Review has canvassed the need for policing legislation to enable, or speed up, information sharing between agencies. Overall, responses received in the first round of public consultation focused on smoothing this path through amendment to the Privacy Act 1993 - the (not always correct) interpretation of which sometimes has the effect of slowing or preventing information flows.[24] A separate provision in policing legislation was thought unnecessary, and ultimately might not achieve its aims if others continue to see the Privacy Act as a barrier to such information sharing.

3.20 Carefully-framed amendments to the Privacy Act could better support the sharing of appropriate information for law enforcement purposes. A vehicle for possible improvements will be the Law Commission’s and Justice Ministry’s current review of the Privacy Act. Radical changes are not anticipated. Rather, through refinements to the Privacy Act’s schedules dealing with information exchange between agencies, constraints to legitimate information sharing could be overcome. An example of the type of adjustment possible is making it clear the Department of Corrections can prewarn Police about inmates’ release dates from prison. Presently, such information is not provided until after release. Especially in family violence cases, early notice a prisoner will return to a community can allow concerted efforts to ensure Protection Orders are not breached. When such pre-release information is not made available, real risks to personal and public safety can arise. Where sensible refinements to the Privacy Act could help avoid these sorts of situations, these should be supported.[25]

SUPPORTING FRONTLINE POLICING

3.21 Any revamp of policing legislation needs to adequately cover day-to-day police work. To the extent appropriate, the Policing Act should help deliver the powers and protections needed to support effective frontline policing activity.

3.22 Subject to any relevant Law Commission recommendations,[26] currently-available powers could be updated, so they provide a clear and enabling framework for identifying people who have been lawfully detained by police, and searching detainees in Police cellblock environments. Options to modernise the current provisions dealing with these two areas of practice - sections 57 and 57A of the 1958 Police Act - were canvassed as part of the review, and reactions to these ideas were generally supportive.[27] These common-sense revisions could be given effect, either through the Bill associated with the Law Commission project on entry, search and seizure, or via the proposed new Policing Act.

Enabling faster identification of people being detained by police

3.23 One proposal might be to introduce provisions authorising members of Police to require a person to furnish identifying particulars, where he or she is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence, and there are reasonable grounds for believing the identity given by the person is false or it cannot satisfactorily be verified by other means. Unlike at present, the person need not be “on a charge”, nor would there be a blanket requirement that he or she is physically taken to a police station. This would enable Police to make full use of technological advances to quickly confirm identities in appropriate cases, without forcing suspects to be arrested and charged, or physically taken to arrestee processing facilities within police stations.

3.24 This power could be extended to cases where people are issued with a summons to answer charges in Court. This would remove the current perceived incentive to arrest suspects to obtain particulars (e.g., for historical fraud offences). It would also be a more efficient way to confirm identifying details of prisoners charged with other offences, without needing to transport them to and from prison.[28]

3.25 It may be most appropriate to take a technology-neutral approach in this part of the new Act. This would open up the possibility police may one day be able to confirm people’s identities using more advanced techniques than the traditional methods of photographs, fingerprints, palmprints and footprints. Arguably, this is a necessary means of ‘future proofing’ this aspect of policing legislation - a theme developed more fully in Chapter 6.

3.26 Any clarified police powers should come with appropriate safeguards. To take account of legitimate privacy concerns, it could be specified that, once used to check a person’s identity, biometric data (e.g., fingerprint images) cannot be permanently retained or added to any Police database. However, if a person is summonsed or arrested for an offence after initial checks are carried out, it is reasonable the biometric information be taken as part of Police’s normal investigative and detainee handling process. The statutory framework drafted to cover this area of practice would need to strike a careful balance.

Clarifying the grounds for searches to be done in police-controlled buildings

3.27 Suitable provisions might also be drafted to enable Police staff to conduct searches in the custodial areas of police stations. This is a logical power which helps ensure the safety of members of Police, detainees, and anyone visiting detainees in Police cells.

3.28 One area where the existing framework could be strengthened is providing for an explicit power to conduct searches in parts of police stations which the public can access. The same arguments in favour of routinely searching all detainees for concealed weapons, drugs, and so forth, apply equally to anyone wishing to enter police-controlled buildings. A measured response to legitimate safety and security concerns would be to adapt overseas precedents where such issues have been squarely addressed in policing legislation.[29]

3.29 However, legal advice suggests adequate search powers can be exercised by consent - with Courts expected to rule in favour of actions to deny entry to police-controlled buildings if members of the public refuse to comply with reasonable search requests. Based on this assurance, it is does not seem necessary at this time to provide a legislative basis for such a search power. Nevertheless, the situation will continue to be monitored in case clearer legal grounds for such searches are required.

Moving people away from danger, or away from crime scenes

3.30 Constabulary powers in New Zealand not only derive from the common law, but also from scores of different statutes which confer specific legal authorities. Despite this long list of powers, one of a constable’s most basic tasks - requesting a person to move past a crash or crime scene, or leave a public place because disorder might occur - is not covered by statute. While in most cases this gap has little real impact (because most people comply with requests to ‘move on’), it seems unsatisfactory such a simple and needed police task remains unsupported in legislation.

3.31 One way to address this gap would be to introduce a new power (possibly under the Summary Offences Act 1981) for members of Police to require people to move from an area. This could strengthen the ability of officers to deal more efficiently with loitering that could impact on public safety and order. It could also be useful in cases where people interfere with Police investigations in public places. This includes vehicle crashes, brawls, crime scenes[30] and other incidents where interference could hinder the way an investigation is conducted, or where the interference may impact on the safety of victims or other innocent people in the vicinity.

3.32 Such a new power could also enable police to disperse individuals or groups who are behaving in a threatening manner; behaviour which can escalate to intimidation or violence, requiring stronger police intervention. In most cases where such a power would apply, police already have authority to arrest (e.g., for disorderly behaviour, breach of the peace, obstructing a police officer in the course of duty, etc.), but a specific ‘move on’ power would enable officers to require people to leave a place in certain circumstances.

3.33 As with all police powers, there would need to be checks and balances. For example, such a power might only be enforceable after a member of Police has requested a person to disperse, and has warned him or her of the consequences of failure to do so. The maximum length of time anyone asked to ‘move on’ would be excluded from an area could also be limited to a reasonable period (e.g., four hours). This is how such statutory ‘move on’ powers operate in a number of international jurisdictions.[31]

3.34 The government has not reached a view on whether such a ‘move on’ power should be introduced in New Zealand. While there is a practical rationale for providing such a power, and no reason to doubt it would be used responsibly by police, it is not immediately obvious such a power is needed, at least on presently-available information. The government thus invites responses on whether a ‘move on’ power would be a sensible addition to the policing tool kit. Based on views received, consideration could be given to introducing such a power.

Creating a statutory presumption that use of handcuffs is a reasonable use of force

3.35 Another area where it may be desirable to seek greater certainty through legislation relates to the use of handcuffs. Although handcuffs have been carried as standard issue equipment by constables since the earliest days of policing in New Zealand, there is no specific statutory authority for the use of handcuffs by police, meaning their use must be justified as reasonable on a case-by-case basis. This has the virtue of allowing for thresholds to shift over time, as social and legal values change. Arguably, though, this benefit can be preserved, while still establishing a more predictable environment for police to make operational decisions whether to use handcuffs in individual cases. In short, handcuffing could be presumed to be a reasonable use of force in general policing, albeit this legal presumption could always be overcome on the evidence in any particular case.

3.36 Importantly, this suggested presumption would help to overcome areas of uncertainty created by judicial rulings. For example, in some cases, Courts have ruled against the use of handcuffs on people in the rear seats of Police cars being driven to stations for evidential breath tests. The reason given for such rulings has been there was no objective basis for the attending officers to fear for their personal safety. Given the difficulty of assessing danger to officer safety on a case-by-case basis, weighed against the minimal use of restraining force which is involved with handcuffs (especially in closely-confined settings, such as Police vehicles, where the potential for injury to self or others is an ever-present risk), a rebuttable presumption in favour of handcuffing being a lawful use of force by police would not seem unreasonable. Additional support for this position might also be taken from the results of public research, which indicate members of the public are relatively comfortable with police having a range of coercive options available to them, so long as officers only use a level of force that is reasonable in the circumstances.[32]

Offering more certainty for police to take incapacitated people into safe custody

3.37 Another feature of daily police work which might be supported by new policing legislation is assisting people who are incapable of caring for themselves due to the after-effects of alcohol or other drugs.

3.38 The current statutory home for this role - the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 - is focused on treatment of people with diagnosable substance use disorders. It is arguably ill-suited to giving police the short-term ability to help ensure the safety of those who have chronically abused alcohol or other drugs. Instead, the ability for police to take incapacitated people into safe custody under the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act could be transferred across into policing legislation.

3.39 The 12 hour maximum ‘sobering up’ time associated with the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act power has also sometimes caused problems. Accordingly, consideration might be given to a durable authority for still-incapacitated people to be held by police, if a medical practitioner judges it still unsafe to release them after an initial 12 hours.

ENABLING MODERN POLICING TACTICS TO FIGHT SERIOUS AND ORGANISED CRIME

3.40 Police needs to be at the forefront of efforts to tackle threats to the safety and security of New Zealand and its people, and this includes being able to act decisively against gangs and other criminal networks operating at the local, national and international levels. Effectively tackling organised crime requires Police to join forces with partner agencies, both in New Zealand and overseas. The virtues of strong co-operation between Police, the New Zealand Customs Service, New Zealand Immigration Service, and so on, are obvious in areas like preventing drug trafficking and people smuggling. The same is true of the contribution which can be made by overseas law enforcement agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, and multi-lateral organisations like the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

3.41 Ensuring good flows of information with and between partner agencies is especially important. Equally, it is important information sharing is not put at risk because of inadequate legal protections. In both regards, New Zealand’s law can be enhanced. Legislative provisions could be advanced which place Police functions such as investigating transnational crime on a firmer footing.

3.42 At the international level, Chapter 2 has already signalled proposals to enable off-shore policing. To support efforts to crack down on transnational crime, further steps may be taken to specifically empower Police to co-operate with foreign enforcement agencies, where it is in New Zealand’s interests to do so and is consistent with New Zealand’s obligations under international law. The proposal would remove any doubt about Police’s ability to release to overseas law enforcement partners relevant information which has been lawfully obtained in New Zealand, or for New Zealand Police to receive information in return. While some encouragement for such exchanges can be read into existing laws (e.g., the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992), a more explicit mandate could be established through the Policing Act.

3.43 Consideration could be given to making clearer provision in the new Act for covert policing practices, such as those associated with Police’s undercover programme. Apart from scant mention in the 2006 Evidence Act, work by undercover police officers currently has no statutory underpinning. As a result, not only are such aspects of policing largely invisible in law, but the legal protections available for undercover personnel are far from comprehensive.

3.44 Infiltrating organised criminal networks can be a vital way for Police to disrupt serious offending, such as the manufacturing and trafficking of illicit drugs. Police staff who do the dangerous work of going undercover to penetrate organised crime groups are entitled to robust legal protections. Those working in covert policing roles should have greater statutory recognition, and the legality of practices such as the use of assumed identities (vital to enable undercover officers to be accepted in criminal circles) should be put beyond doubt. While the use of false identity documents like driver’s licences is currently possible by virtue of agreements between Police and the issuing agencies, such agency-toagency arrangements do not have the backing of legislation.

3.45 Drawing from overseas precedents,[33] the use of assumed identities by staff such as undercover and witness protection officers could be formalised. The intention would be to put clear rules in place to allow authorised Police staff to acquire and use assumed identities; ensure evidence of assumed identities, like passports, can be issued and cancelled; and clarify immunities from liability for actions by Police staff during covert operations. This would offer clearer legal authority for an important part of policing, as well as serving the wider interests of certainty and transparency.

3.46 Consideration could also be given to bolstering protections for the work of Police’s Crime Monitoring Centre (CMC) - the specialist unit which monitors intercepted communications obtained under statutory warrants. Substantive changes are expected to proceed under the umbrella of the Law Commission’s project on search and surveillance. It may nonetheless be possible and appropriate to progress a small number of consequential amendments as part of the Policing Act. These include:

• prohibiting unauthorised disclosure of the fact that an intercept operation is planned or active
• significantly strengthening the present $500 fine maximum penalty for these offences to reflect the importance of not jeopardising the integrity of covert operations and the safety of those involved[34]
• allowing for evidentiary certificates by CMC staff to be received in Court proceedings, similar to the way analyses by Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) staff can be received into evidence in drugs cases, avoiding the need for monitoring personnel to personally attend Court to set out facts relating to the execution of an interception warrant.[35]

3.47 Finally in this area, ways to put the work of Police’s tactical groups on a firmer legal footing could be explored. At present, generic legislation which seeks to minimise hazards creates some doubt about the ability of specially-trained police to deploy various explosive items such as distraction devices in closely-confined areas (e.g., when securing a house an armed offender is refusing to leave). The legislation also raises uncertainties about the continued ability to maintain legitimate holdings of highexplosive material in specially-controlled reserves in certain police stations.

3.48 Mindful of other exemptions from laws which apply to handling hazardous material,[36] these difficulties could be resolved by using the Policing Act to make a small number of consequential amendments. This would enable Police’s tactical groups to more sure-footedly undertake their important and necessary work.

IDENTIFICATION OF POLICE

3.49 Another way legislation can support effective policing is by providing assurances about the status of people either presenting as police or as connected with Police. This is an area where current legislation could be enhanced.

3.50 Several positive steps could be taken. First, New Zealand Police differs from many other police forces in not issuing its members with a warrant card, or legal badge of office. The current system of a plastic identification card, with a photograph and name, serves a similar role, but has no legal status. Instead, section 41 of the current Police Act states “common reputation shall be evidence” a member of Police holds his or her office. While common reputation might have sufficed in 1950s New Zealand, it seems inadequate in an age where identity theft and misrepresentation is more common, and where citizens rightly seek reassurance about who they are dealing with.

3.51 To satisfy the need for appropriate assurances, it is proposed to implement a warrant card system for all members of Police who are entitled to exercise policing powers. Members without such powers will continue to hold official Police identity cards. The warrant card will positively support the reputation of those working for Police, and evidence powers they hold. It will be linked to employment status, so if a member is suspended, stood-down, discharged, resigns or retires, the warrant card will be retrieved from the person.

3.52 Consideration might also be given to strengthening protections against impersonating a member of Police, and unauthorised use of Police uniforms and related articles, as well as more directly protecting against use of the word “police” and its derivatives.

3.53 Provisions in the 1958 Police Act seek to prevent non-approved use of Police insignia and trading off the name “Police”, although the maximum penalties for the relevant offences appear low in comparison with those available for similar types of offences.[37] An indication, perhaps, of the lack of deterrence offered by the current penalties comes from the number of people who have attempted to impersonate police in recent times. In the past decade, there have been an average of around 50 recorded offences of “personating police” each year. Such offences, especially in the current climate of increased awareness about security risks, have the potential to be very serious. Many citizens faced with a person claiming to be a police officer would feel obliged to comply with any reasonablesounding requests or instructions. This could have dire consequences. For example, a person pretending to be a police officer could unlawfully access a building to assist in the commission of a crime, or could obtain access to information which might facilitate a serious criminal offence.

3.54 Against this backdrop, one might question whether a significantly higher level of fine and/or longer custodial sentence is appropriate to communicate the seriousness of this type of offending. Advice will be taken on the most appropriate penalties to ensure consistency across the statute book.

3.55 It is further proposed to more directly protect against misuse of the word “police” and its derivatives. Contexts where this can be damaging include use in advertisements and operating names of businesses which infer some type of official endorsement. To strengthen existing protections, while still allowing for legitimate uses to continue, the Policing Act might introduce a consent system, similar to that used in New South Wales, so the Commissioner can give conditional approval to use the term “police”.[38]

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Footnotes

[17] The implications of this for the doctrine of constabulary independence are explored further in Chapter 5.

[19] See Dame Margaret Bazley, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct (2007), para 2.36.

[20] UMR Research, What the New Zealand public want and expect from their police in the 21st century (2007), p 16.

[21] See subsections 6(2) and 6(3) of the Police Act 1958.

[22] The potential to assign this power is somewhat enabled by section 57B of the current Police Act, but was intended to apply to one-off situations, such as enabling a sole charge constable's spouse to search a prisoner of the same gender.

[23] The Commission's project on entry, search and seizure is expected to result in recommendations on the scope and adequacy of current powers to search persons, places and vehicles, and seize relevant items. A final report from this project is expected to be completed in June 2007.

[24] Police Act Review, Perspectives on policing (2007), pp 46-47.

[25] For this particular situation, an appropriate amendment is currently before parliament for consideration (see Supplementary Order Paper 99, which proposes amendments to clause 109 of the Criminal Justice Reform Bill). Should it not be possible to progress this amendment, the fine-tuning changes could perhaps be made via a consequential amendment in the Policing Bill.

[26] As noted earlier, a final report from the Commission's project on entry, search and seizure is due to be published in June 2007.

[27] Police Act Review, Perspectives on policing (2007), pp 42-46.

[28] As provided for currently under regulation 27(v) of the Corrections Regulations 2005.

[29] For example, there is provision for police to use electronic screening devices for entrants to buildings under section 332 of Queensland's Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000.

[30] It is understood the Law Commission's upcoming report on Search and Surveillance will recommend a new power for police officers to secure a crime scene until a warrant is obtained. However, this limited proposal would not fully address the wide range of situations where a 'move on' power would be of assistance to police.

[31] As, for example, under section 15B of Tasmania's Police Offences Act 1935.

[32] UMR Research, What the New Zealand public want and expect from their police in the 21st century (2007), p 11.

[33] For example, Part IAC of Australia's Crimes Act 1914 (Cwlth).

[34] The current prohibitions are contained in section 312K of the Crimes Act 1961 and section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978. Greater alignment with protections available around the existence or operation of call data warrants, under subsections 10G and 10H of the Telecommunications (Residual Provisions Act) 1987, may be appropriate.

[35] This would formalise an existing protocol whereby CMC monitors do not need to be called to give evidence in Court proceedings, in recognition of the chain of control which comes with the centralised CMC model, and the fact that monitors' products are seen as work-in-progress. Provision for such evidentiary certificates is fairly commonplace overseas. For an Australian example, see section 61 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cwlth).

[36] For example, see the exclusions for the New Zealand Defence Forces contained in section 3(2)-(8) of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, and regulation 9A of the Hazardous Substances (Classes 1 to 5 Controls) Regulations 2001.

[37] Section 51 of the Act contains an offence of impersonating a member of Police, which is punishable upon summary conviction of a fine not exceeding $200, a term of up to three months' imprisonment, or both. Section 51A has a complementary offence of unauthorised use of a police uniform (or any item of uniform or related articles, including the Police crest and badge), which is punishable upon summary conviction of a fine not exceeding $500, and a further $50 per day where the misuse is of a continuing nature. By way of comparison, the equivalent offence of pretending to be a corrections officer carries a maximum fine of $2,000: see section 144 of the Corrections Act 2004.

[38] For instance, under regulation 107 of New South Wales' Police Regulations 2000, the Police Credit Union is one of the listed bodies which is approved to use "police" in its operating name.

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Contents

• Executive summary

• Chapter 1: The case for change
• Chapter 2: Key principles to guide policing
• Chapter 3: Effective policing for New Zealanders
• Chapter 4: People in policing
• Chapter 5: Platforms for success
• Chapter 6: Anticipating the future
• Chapter 7: Next steps

• References
• Appendices